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Abstract 
This case study provides an in-depth look into the campaign to retire an aging nuclear 
power plant located in the southeast corner of Vermont.  The Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power 
Station (VY) began commercial operations in 1972 under a forty year operating license issued 
by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).  Opposition to the plant’s existence has been 
unwavering and has increased in intensity since the sale of the plant in 2002.  The Vermont 
Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation (VYNPC), a consortium of local and regional utilities, sold 
VY to an out-of-state corporation owner known as Entergy.  The company was quick to apply 
for approvals from the state and federal governments, to increase the plant’s power production, 
to store spent nuclear fuel on-site and for a twenty year license extension.  Advocates were 
unsuccessful at blocking the power up-rate and the construction of an on-site spent fuel storage 
facility, but were successful in blocking the plant’s license extension. 
Advocates new in order to be successful they must collaborate in an effort to pass 
legislation that would bring the power of deciding VY’s fate to Vermont’s General Assembly 
and ultimately the people.  The decision was made to form a coalition… Safe Power Vermont.  
In 2006,  the coalition and its supporters won the passage of ACT 160, which empowered the 
legislature to vote on VY’s continued operation based on issues related to reliability and 
economics.  The coalition was successful again when in 2010 the Vermont Senate voted not to 
considered the plant for continued operation past March 2012.  Currently, the legality of the 
legislation is under scrutiny in a federal district court in a case brought by Entergy.     
The case study narrative follows the arch of VY’s operational life and history while 
tracking the evolution of the campaign by highlighting key moments that facilitated outcomes.  
J. Unsicker’s “Advocacy Circles” Map is used as a method of organizing information and as a 
lens to analyze the data.   This is done in an effort to assist other advocates in succeeding in 
similar movements across the United States.  The research and prospective given here, has been 
acquired from personal experience collaborating directly with local and regional advocacy 
groups involved in the campaign, as well as independent research.  
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Introduction 
 My practicum was spent gaining knowledge in the fields of policy advocacy and 
renewable energy.  I spent time working with the Safe Power Vermont coalition as an in intern 
with the Vermont Public Interest Research Group (VPIRG) a member organization.  VPIRG 
collaborates directly with other advocacy organization, through the coalition, in their effort to 
retire the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station (VY) on schedule in March 2012.  As a 
VPIRG graduate intern, I helped the Clean Energy Advocate and the field organizing team in 
implementing various tactics aimed at raising awareness among constituents and mobilizing 
them to take action.  I conducted research into coalition targets and opponents, produced 
informational materials and helped organize activists for action.  I was fortunate to have 
worked with the coalition during the January 2010 Senate vote, which denied the current owner 
of the plant, Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee’s (ENVY),  its request for a Certificate of 
Public Good room the state.  Under Vermont law, Entergy cannot operate the plant past the 
original forty-year licensing period, which expires in March 2012.  The Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) recently approved Entergy’s request for a twenty year license extension.  
In most states the NRC is the only regulator of commercial nuclear power plants.  But, in 2006 
Vermont became the first state to pass legislation that enables the legislature to vote on whether 
it is in the public’s interest to continue operating VY.  The legality of the Act 160 and the 
decision made by the Vermont Senate is currently being contested by Entergy in a federal 
district court.              
 I was first introduced to the issue by Professor Jeff Unsicker1 while attending his 
introductory course on Policy Advocacy in the fall of 2008.  After learning the extent of the 
plant’s physical deterioration, history of frequent failures and the mass of highly radioactive 
waste being stored on-site, I was shocked to hear that the NRC was considering Entergy’s 
application for a license extension.  It seemed inevitable that VY would receive an extension 
considering the NRC had never denied one.  I grew up in central VT and attended high school 
in Putney; only twenty miles north of the reactor.  Never before had I considered the 
                                                 
1 SIT Graduate Institute in Brattleboro, VT 
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implications of hosting a nuclear power plant and its impact on the ecological, social and 
economic sustainability of the host region.  I knew cleaner, safer energy alternative existed that 
could be deployed locally using renewable sources.  Operating VY beyond its designed 
capacity and  operational life increases the chance of a major accident occurring, which could 
decimate the local ecology and economy.  And, with no solution for disposing of the waste that 
has been produced over the past forty years it is unconscionable to produce another twenty 
years worth.  The continued operation of VY exposes current and future generations to undue 
risk.   
 I immediately wanted to get involved in the campaign.  I had learned that a dedicated 
network of local and regional advocacy groups had worked tirelessly to pass a key piece of 
legislation that gave the power to determine VY’s fate to the state legislature via Act 160.  I 
began volunteering with the Vermont Citizens Action Network (VCAN), the lobbying arm of 
the Citizens Awareness Network (CAN), in the Fall of 2008 helping the coalition in their 
efforts to raise awareness among voters in key legislative districts throughout Vermont.  I went 
door-to-door delivering informational pamphlets, talking with constituents about the issues and 
collecting voter signatures who supported the initiative.  I was later given the opportunity to 
work with Nuclear Free Vermont (NFV), a small grassroots organization, who in collaboration 
with CAN, VCAN and Safe Power Vermont had acquired a grant with the primary goal of 
winning the Act 160 vote.  To achieve this, the coalition needed to gain enough constituent 
support in priority districts to pressure those legislators who may be more apt to vote in favor of 
retiring. 
During my time at VPIRG I was offered a position as an installer with a regional 
renewable energy company.  For over a year and a half, I have been installing solar electric, and 
hot water systems for residential and commercial customers.  It has been a rewarding 
experience to have a direct impact on increasing renewable energy supplies in Vermont.        
Purpose of capstone 
 The purpose of this case study is to provide an in-depth look into the campaign to close 
VY in order to gain a better understanding of advocacy and the process of policy change 
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specific to energy issues in Vermont.  It is done in an 
attempt to assist other advocates in succeeding in 
similar movements across the United States.  The arch 
of the narrative follows VY operational history while 
tracking the evolution of the campaign, and the 
coalition by highlighting key moments that helped in 
facilitating successful outcomes.  The research and 
prospective given, has been acquired from both personal experiences collaborating with the 
individuals and groups involved in the campaign, and through independent research and 
analysis.  As a method of organizing and interpreting the information I have utilized the 
Unsicker’s “Advocacy Circles” Map.  Above is a visual representation of the Advocacy Circles 
Map, which has been adapted from materials provided by J. Unsicker from 2008 to 2010. 
 The map provides a frame work for analyzing the advocate role and effectiveness within 
the advocacy context.  As described by J. Unsicker, it is “… a simple way to visualize the 
dynamic, iterative dimensions of the reality or territory of  advocacy.”2  The advocates operate 
within the political, strategic and policy circles, which are imbedded with the larger context.  
Advocates represent the group of persons, a formal or informal organization, seeking to 
influence one or more policy issues.  To be effective, advocates must have or develop the 
capacity to: 
• analyze and act in accordance with the larger context;  
• carry out policy research and analysis,  
• identify and navigate a political system composed of numerous different actors,  
• develop and carry out various approaches for influencing policy makers, and 
• monitor, evaluate and learn from all of the above. 
The first four of those activities represented by the other circles. Advocates are at the nexus of 
them all, linking them all together.  The context circle represents the immediate political-
economic-cultural context at a specific moment or period in time.  The three remaining  
“arenas” or circles (Policy, Politics and Strategy) represent the areas that advocates are 
                                                 
2 Unsicker, 2010, pp. 12 
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constantly analyzing and acting within or simply, the “what,” “who” and “how”.  In contrast to 
a map, the over-lapping circles suggest that there is ongoing activity in each arena and that 
those activities continually interact and influence those in the other arenas.   
In the Policy arena, advocates and other actors carry out research and/or less formal 
forms of information gathering that result in the definition of a problem or set of problems, 
their causes and one or more policy goals that are designed to address the cause(s) and solve the 
problem(s).  In the arena of Politics, there are formal and informal systems by which policies 
are made, changed and implemented, as well as numerous actors who are engaged in this 
system.  The main actors are the targets (those policy makers who need to be influenced), allies, 
opponents, and the general public.  In the Strategy arena, the advocates plan and carry out 
activities that they believe will help them influence targets and thus achieve their policy goals.  
This includes (a) analyzing the political systems and actors, including themselves, and (b) 
combining that knowledge with their policy goals to formulate intermediate and short term 
objectives for specific strategies and tactics. 
Context 
The notion of an atom has existed for centuries, but only within the last one hundred 
years have we begun to understand the enormous power contained in its tiny mass.  In the years 
proceeding and during World War II, most atomic research and development focused on 
weapons creation.  After the war, the United States government wanted to encourage the 
development of nuclear technologies for peaceful civilian applications.  In 1946, Congress 
passed the first iteration of the Atomic Energy Act with the intent to regulate nuclear energy 
development in the United States (U.S.) and manage the nuclear weapons technology it had 
jointly developed with England and Canada during the war.  The act mandated that nuclear 
weapons development and nuclear power management would be regulated by a civilian agency 
dubbed the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC).  It was later amended in 1954 to include 
increased support for the nuclear power industry.3 
                                                 
3 Atomic Energy Act of 1954 
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By the mid-1950s, scientists had demonstrated that nuclear reactors could produce 
reliable energy output, and in 1957the first commercial nuclear power plant was built in 
Shippingport, Pennsylvania.  In 1974 the Energy Reorganization Act was passed abolishing the 
AEC and splitting its functions between two new agencies: the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC) and the Energy Research and Development Administration - now the Department of 
Energy (DOE).  Today, the NRC regulates the nuclear power industry in the U.S., while the 
DOE is responsible for overseeing the development and production of nuclear weapons, as well 
as the promotion of nuclear power.  
 In 1982 the Nuclear Waste Policy Act established the US government’s responsibility to 
provide a place for the permanent disposal of high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel, 
as well as the generators’ responsibility to bear the costs of permanent disposal.  The legislation 
tasked the DOE with finding, constructing, operating and decommissioning a permanent 
geological repository for the waste.  The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is responsible 
for setting public health and safety standards for release of radioactive materials from a 
repository, and the NRC is tasked with communicating the regulations governing construction, 
operation and closure to federal officials and the public. Currently, owners of nuclear reactors are 
required to pay the costs of disposal through a fee paid by consumers of the power.   
In 2002, under heavy opposition from local residents and other groups, construction 
began on the Yucca Mountain Nuclear Waste Repository in Nevada; eighty miles northwest of 
Las Vegas.  Operations at the facility were effectively terminated with the passage of the 2011 
federal budget, which defunded operations at the site.  The closure was due to economic 
constraints, as well as concerns over the long-term integrate of the facility and its impact on 
public health.  The DOE continues to look for an appropriate repository, but no timeline has been 
given for when a repository with begin accepting radioactive waste. 
Vermont Yankee – A History 
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 In 1966, the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation (VYNPC)4 applied to the 
AEC for a permit to build a nuclear reactor along the banks of the Connecticut River in 
southeastern Vermont.  The proposal came during the height of nuclear power expansion in the 
U.S.   Many projects faced stiff opposition from local advocacy organizations, concerned 
citizens and officials.  It sparked a national movement lead by anti-nuclear activists and 
environmentalists who were concerned over the long-term effects of nuclear technologies.  The 
VYNPC faced similar opposition from local groups, but developers were able to thwarted 
efforts to stop the project, and in 1967 construction began.  Two years later, the VYNPC 
applied for an operating license to operate the reactor, and on November 30, 1972 the Vermont 
Yankee Nuclear Power Station, or Vermont Yankee (VY), began producing power for the New 
England power grid with a forty year operating license from the AEC.  
From 1972 to 2001 the plant operated reliable with few major incidents or issues.  This 
record of service began to deteriorate in 2002 when, Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC 
(ENVY), a subsidiary of Entergy Nuclear Incorporated,  purchased VY from the VYNPC.  
Entergy created two subsidiaries, an owner ENVY and operator Entergy Nuclear Operation 
(ENO) to limit the parent company’s liability exposure.  Through the sale, ENVY received the 
reactor complex, all nuclear fuel inventories and related site real estate.  The sale included a 
revenue sharing agreement (RSA) and a power purchasing agreement (PPA).  Under the PPA, 
three of the former owners, including two Vermont utilities5, buy a portion of the electricity 
produced by VY at a set price; approximately 4.5 cents per kilowatt hour (kWh).  The RSA 
stipulates that fifty percent of the revenue generated from energy sales greater than a fixed 
market price is shared among the signatories.  Both contracts expire in 2012.   
Entergy’s recent efforts to obtain new PPAs from Vermont utilities have failed and in 
May 2011 Green Mountain Power (GMP), a former owner of VY and PPA/RSA contract 
signatory, announced that it signed a PPA with NextEra Energy Resources LLC, owner of the 
                                                 
4 VYNPC was a consortium of eight utilities from the northeast: Central Vermont Public Service Corp. (35 percent); 
Green Mountain Power Corp. (19 percent); New England Power Company (22.5 percent); Connecticut Light and 
Power Co (9.5 - percent); Central Maine Power Co (4.0 percent); Public Service Company of New Hampshire (4.0 
percent); Cambridge Electric Light Co (2.5 percent) and Western Massachusetts Electric Co (2.5 percent). 
5 Central Vermont Public Service (CVPS) and Green Mountain Power (GMP) 
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Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant in New Hampshire.  The twenty-three year agreement is a fixed-
price contract that adjusts with inflation.6  Entergy also assumed liability for managing the 
decommissioning fund and the decommissioning of the plant upon its retirement.   
Corporate Spin-off 
 In 2007 Entergy announced plans to “spin-off” six of their eleven reactors.  The 
company created two new firms: Enexus and EquaGen.   Enexus would be the standalone 
owner of the six reactors Entergy planned to “spin-off”, including the Pilgrim, James A. 
FitzPatrick, Indian Point reactors 2 & 3, Palisades and Vermont Yankee nuclear power plant.  
EquaGen, a new limited liability corporation, would take a fifty percent ownership of Enexus, 
as well as Entergy’s five remaining reactors (Arkansas Nuclear One, Cooper, Grand Gulf River 
Bend and Waterford 3).  In-turn, Entergy would have fifty percent ownership of EquaGen 
Nuclear LLC.  In their application to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Entergy 
listed twenty-one risks associated with the “spin-off” of these nuclear holdings.  Summarized, 
they represent acknowledgements by Entergy that Enexus would carry substantial debt and 
such a low investment rating that it would negatively affect the company’s ability to obtain 
financing.  This would make it difficult to pay for plant upgrades and operating costs.  They 
also concede that a market for the stock did not yet exist and if one failed to develop the 
company’s asset value would not be adequate; bring into question the company’s long-term 
sustainability.7  In order to overcome these short-comings, Entergy promised lower prices on 
power.  
 The proposal was heavily criticized for appearing as if Entergy executives and 
shareholders were trying to isolate themselves from any financial or ethical responsibility 
incumbent upon the owner and operator of the second largest fleet of nuclear reactors in the 
U.S.8  Even so, in 2008 the proposal was approved by both the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) and the NRC.  The Michigan and Massachusetts state regulators, hosts to 
                                                 
6 Curran, 2011 
7 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2008 
8 Exelon Nuclear Partners, a division of Exelon Generation, is the largest in the U.S. and third largest in the world; 
operating seventeen reactors on ten different sites. 
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the James A. Fitz Patrick and Pilgrim reactors respectively, also approved the proposed 
restructuring; however, in February 2010 the Vermont Senate, under the authority of ACT 160, 
voted not to review Entergy’s application for a Certificate of Public Good (CPG); killing the 
initiative within the state.  Later that year, the New York Public Service Commission (NYPSC) 
rejected the proposal stating that it appeared financially unstable and not in the public interest.  
This effectively ended Entergy’s plans for Enexus and EquaGen.   Entergy’s plan to “spin-
off” its reactor fleet helped advocates solidify Entergy’s image as an out-of-state corporate 
owner that does not have the interests of Vermonters at heart.   
Relicensing 
 On March 21, 2011 the NRC granted Entergy a twenty year extension to their federal 
license to operate VY.  Under current state law, Entergy will not be able to operate the plant past 
March 2012 without a CPG.  In April 2011, Entergy filed a federal suit against Vermont seeking 
an injunction to prevent enforcement of Vermont law regarding VY’s license extension or any 
regulating operations and on-site storage of spent fuel.  Entergy also wants the court to issue a 
judgment that federal law preempts Vermont (state) law.   
 The extension has also been contested by the Vermont Department of Public Service 
(VDPS) and the New England Coalition (NEC) who filed suit against the NRC citing the 
relicensing of VY is in violation of the Clean Water Act.  By law, Entergy must have a license to 
uptake and discharge water into the Connecticut River located adjacent to the plant.  When the 
NRC approved Entergy’s license extension it did so without the plant obtaining either a water 
quality certificate from the EPA or a waiver from the state.  The plant uses water from the river 
for running and cooling the reactor.  Water from the plant is often discharged back into the river 
causing significant rises in water temperatures within the vicinity of the plant.  This can have a 
negative impact on the aquatic ecosystem.   
Decommissioning 
 Over the past eight years Entergy has failed to fulfill its commitment to maintaining a 
sufficient balance in the decommissioning fund, which was created by the previous owners to 
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cover the costs of dismantling the facility.  Upon purchase of VY in 2002, Entergy assumed the 
responsibility for managing the fund.  Since transfer of ownership, Entergy has contributed zero 
dollars to the fund, which has resulted in a funding shortfall of over $500 million.  Entergy has 
repeatedly change its position in an attempt to evade the responsibility and now argue that they 
have no direct responsibility for the fund. 9  As a result, the fund currently has less than half of 
the $1 billion decommissioning is estimated to cost.  If the fund balance is insufficient to cover 
the cost of decommissioning, it is likely that Vermont ratepayers will have to pay the 
difference. 
 Both ENVY, and ENO signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the 
Vermont Public Service Board (VPSB), which regulates the activities and actions of utilities 
within the state.  As it pertained to decommissioning the MOU states that: 
1. Decommissioning to be complete by March 31, 2022. 10 
2. Decommissioning must meet standards outlined by the NRC 
3. ENVY would provide additional funds or other acceptable financial assurances as needed to ensure that 
funding will be sufficient to accomplish decommissioning 
4. ENVY is to use its power to assure that the spent fuel is removed from the site in a reasonable manner 
and as quickly as possible 
5. ENVY is responsible for meeting all future decommissioning costs and any increases needed in the 
contributions for decommissioning will not be passed on to Vermont consumers.11 
In its approval of sale, the VPSB reiterated that the corporation had accepted the financial risks 
associated with owning, operating and decommissioning VY and the corporation would bear 
the burden alone.  Vermont utilities and ratepayers would be shielded and any contributions 
needed to ensure decommissioning upon shutdown would not be passed on to Vermont 
consumers.12  Entergy has repeated stated its understanding of the decommissioning liability.  
In a 2001 corporate news release, Entergy acknowledged that upon purchase of VY it would 
                                                 
9 Curry, 2008  
10 State of Vermont Public Service Board, 2002 
11 Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, 2009 
12 Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, 2009 
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take control of nuclear fuel inventories and assume liability for the decommissioning and the 
fund. 13   
 Ten years of Entergy’s own 10-K filings with the SEC, from 2001 to 2009, also assert 
acknowledgement of Entergy’s liability for funding decommissioning.  These filings require the 
Entergy to show all its assets and liabilities, which include its financial obligations relating to 
all activities and costs associated with decommissioning VY.  It was stated again in a 2002 
corporate new release, “… [Entergy] would assume all financial and operational risks of 
increases in operating and fuel costs, decommissioning costs, used fuel costs, nuclear waste 
disposal costs, cost of any accidents at VY, costs of premature shutdowns and/or extended 
outages.”14 
Decommissioning involves three main activities: removing the industrial facilities, 
transporting storing and safeguarding the spent fuel stored on-site, and finally, restoring the site 
for future use.  Removing the industrial facilities involves removing the reactor vessel and the 
miles of radioactive piping, tanks, chambers, as well as tons of contaminated soil below and 
adjacent to the reactor complex.  Currently, components are dismantled and shipped to a 
storage facility in Tennessee, Texas or Utah.  The remainder of the non-radioactive areas such 
as administrative buildings and workshops are recycled or deposited in local land-fills.  In all, 
over 670,000 cubic feet of low-level radioactive material and an estimated 135,000 cubic feet 
of contaminated soil will be removed from the site.   
All nuclear reactors slated for decommissioning require a “cooling-off” period to allow 
some of the radiation to dissipate before work can safely begin.  Due to the shortfall in 
decommissioning funding, Entergy proposes to put VY into a condition called SAFESTOR.  
SAFSTOR is one alternative to the prompt decommissioning of a retired nuclear power plant.  
It enables the company to postpone decommissioning up to sixty years.15  This scenario 
                                                 
13 Entergy Corporation, 2001 
14 Entergy Corporation, 2002 
15 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2008 
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transfers the responsibility for decommissioning to future generations and does not capitalize 
on the experience and skill of the existing workforce. 
 Decommissioning and restoring the VY site to a “green field” will likely be one of 
Vermont’s largest industrial projects.  Entergy’s estimates that the cost of decommissioning 
will approach a billion dollars or more by 2012.16  The decommissioning process requires the 
collaboration of nuclear safety and engineering experts to design and implement a 
comprehensive safety and demolition plans.  There will be an obvious need to employ qualified 
contractors and labors to carry-out the various stages.  TLG Services, Inc, a subsidiary of 
Entergy, estimates that removing VY’s reactor facilities alone will cost over a half a billion 
dollars and take one million working hours to complete.  Entergy contracts with TLG Services, 
to design decommissioning plans and implement them.  In a 2007 report, Decommissioning 
Cost Analysis for the VYNPS, TLG Services concluded that prompt decommissioning is the 
most appropriate and cost-effective option for VY.  The process would be more efficient and 
cost effective if the company capitalized on the skills and abilities of the existing workforce.17  
TLG Services also recognized that expedited clean-up ensures the responsibility for 
decommissioning is not transferred to future generations.   
Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage 
 A large part of the decommissioning involves safely removing the spent fuel from the 
cooling pool, transporting it to a storage facility and safeguarding it against natural, and human 
threats.  Over 140 million pounds of spent nuclear fuel has been generated from commercial 
reactors in the U.S. and an additional 4.4 million pounds is generated annually by operating 
reactors.  The majority of which will be radioactive for tens of thousands of years. 18  As of 
2011, there is over 1.3 million pounds of spent fuel being stored on-site at VY.  The majority, 
1.1 million pounds, is stored in a cooling pool located several stories above and adjacent to the 
nuclear reactor.  This storage tank is positioned outside the reactor’s containment vessel, which 
                                                 
16 Vermont Department of Public Service, 2008 
17 TLG Services, Inc., 2007 
18 Alvarez, 2011, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2009; Congressional Research Service, 2004  
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is a steel reinforced concrete structure that encases the reactor.  It is designed to contain the 
release of radiation and radioactive material in the event of a meltdown or explosion.  The pool 
at VY currently holds three times the amount of spent fuel stored at Fukushima Dai-Ichi’s 
crippled Unit 4 reactor in Japan.19     
 The remainder of spent fuel at VY is stored on-site in dry casks at an Independent Spent 
Fuel Storage Installation (ISFI).  Entergy obtained approval from both the state and NRC to 
establish an ISFI in 2006.  The company initiated the process to avoid exceeding the cooling 
pool's licensed capacity; enabling the plant to continue operating.  Plant managers began 
transferring the older spent fuel assemblies from the pool into dry-casks in the spring of 2008.  
A malfunctioning crane dropped the first loaded cask of spent fuel four inches to the concrete 
floor of the refueling room.  The  accident was later attributed to the failure of a relay in an 
overhead crane - the crane was reportedly tested in 1975 for only about 70% of the weight of a 
fully loaded cask.   
 This method of storage is becoming more common at reactor sites throughout the U.S.  
due to the absence of a federal repository.  Currently, twenty of the nation’s 104 operating 
reactors have ISFI storage facilities.  In 2010 the federal government cancelled plans to 
complete construction on a repository in Nevada at the Yucca Mountain Nuclear Waste 
Repository.  As a result, this nuclear waste must be safeguarded at VY and other sites across 
the nation for the foreseeable future. 20  Multiple lawsuits seeking damages have been brought 
against the federal government for failure to open a spent-fuel repository as required by the 
1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act. 
Timeline of Incidents 
 Over its thirty-nine year operating life, VY  has experienced numerous incidents, many 
occurring within the last decade.  Many opponents point to the plant’s aging infrastructure and 
the added stresses of an up-rate in power output authorized by state and federal officials in 
                                                 
19 Alvarez, 2011, pp. 1 
20 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2008 
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2006.  The approval allowed Entergy to increase power production by twenty percent – from 
514 megawatts (MW) to 620 MW. 21  The rate of deterioration is exacerbated by corporate cost-
cutting policies that result in deferred maintenance schedules and staff limitations.  Since 2004, 
there have been over fifty incidents at the plant.  Some of the more notable events are described 
in the following paragraphs in an effort to provide contextual detail. 
 In June of 2004 a fire broke out in one of the plant’s transformers causing an immediate 
shutdown of reactor operations or SCRAM.  In the same year, Entergy was cited by the NRC 
for inadequacies in tracking spent fuel inventories when plant managers were unable to located 
two irradiated fuel rods.  They were found later at the bottom of the cooling pool.  Inspectors 
also discovered numerous cracks in the plant’s steam dryer.  This component is not part of the 
critical safety system, but its proper function is important to reliable reactor operation.  Other 
reactors have experienced problems with steam dryer cracking resulting in pieces breaking off 
and falling into steam lines that lead to the turbine.  These piece could disrupt the proper 
function of components down the line.  The steam dryer’s role is to reduce the moisture content 
of the steam coming from the reactor.  This increases the life of reactor components and 
reduces the amount of radiation present in the steam as it exits the reactor.  Additional crack 
have been discovered during inspections in 2005 and 2008.  After an inspection in July 2010, 
the NRC states the deterioration of the steam dryer at VY is considered a critical indicator of 
aging and stress at the plant. 
 One of the most significant events that has come to define the physical state of VY was 
the collapse of a cooling tower in August of 2007, causing a fifty percent reduction in power 
output.   The collapse was a result of the degradation of the support structure.  Contributing 
factors were determined to be the failure of managers to look at industry wide problems, 
inadequacies in routine inspections and financial constraints.22  The collapsed portion was 
repaired, but in the Summer of 2008 a leak was discovered that later was found to be a result of 
                                                 
21 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2006 & 2011 
22 Gunderson, 2009 
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inadequacies in the repairs performed on the collapses tower section.  A followed up inspection 
in Fall discovered that structural support brackets located in the cooling towers were inadequate 
for the load and required reinforcement.  These findings highlight the lack of oversight from 
plant managers and the NRC, as well as the reactive nature of the plant’s maintenance policy.   
 Starting in 2009, plant managers begin detecting a series of leaks containing radioactive 
water within the plant that require immediate repairs and reductions in the plant’s power output.  
At one point the leak was purging as much as sixty gallons of highly radioactive water per 
minute.  The most significant, was discovered the following year on January 7th when Entergy 
notified regulators that workers had detected elevated levels of radioactive tritium in a 
groundwater monitoring well at the plant.  It was later confirmed that underground piping was 
among the possible sources of the contamination.  This was significant due to an earlier 
testimony given to the VPSB by Entergy executives, in which they stated that there were no 
underground tanks or piping at the plant that could contained or carry radioactive water.  
During the cleanup workers find another, more potent radioactive isotope in the soil near the 
leak strontium-90; a byproduct of nuclear fission and linked to cancer and leukemia. Strontium-
90 has also been found in fish caught in the river adjacent to the plant. 
 An investigation was immediately launched to determine if there was an attempt 
by Entergy executives to misled state officials.  As a result, ENVY vice-president Jay 
Thayer, the executive responsible for operations at VY, is relieved of his duties following 
revelations of questionable statements he made to state officials in which he denied the 
existence of underground pipes that were later found to be the source of radioactive leaks.  
The NRC also found that Entergy is out of compliance with the minimum industrial 
standards for groundwater protection at VY, citing failures regarding “leak detection 
methods,” “enhancements to prevent spills or leaks from reaching groundwater,”  
“preventive maintenance of equipment to minimize the potential of radioactive material,” 
and failure to establish “a site-specific groundwater monitoring plan”.  
 In addition to structural and mechanical failures, Entergy has been cited numerous time 
for failure to comply with federal regulations relating to  maintenance and radioactive 
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containment.  In 2009 a maintenance supervisor is suspended after testing positive for alcohol 
during a random fitness-for-duty test.  It was the third known incident of a VY employee 
testing positive for a controlled substance in the past two years.  
 This timeline highlights an ongoing concern that Entergy’s commitment to safety and 
being forthright with the public, state and federal regulators and safety agencies.  Other nuclear 
plants around the country where radioactivity has been found in groundwater have seen their 
costs of decommissioning climb significantly. 
Vermont 
 Vermont (VT) is a relative small state both geographically and demographically.  As of 
2010, the state  maintains a population of just over 625,000 inside a land area of roughly 9,000 
square miles.  It is a rural state where the majority of the population live in small, rural 
communities many relying on Vermont’s  natural resources to sustain their lives and 
livelihoods.  As a result, Vermont possesses a unique sociopolitical culture whose values are 
rooted in the relationship citizens have with the natural environment.  Conserving Vermont’s 
distinctive landscape and resource base is at the center of many political debates and is a key 
factor in charting Vermont’s social and economic development.  This physical and emotional 
bond has fostered a strong sense, and desire for personal freedom and independence.  Even as 
Vermonters fought, and fight for freedom and independence they understand that to protect 
their freedoms they must work together for the common good of the larger community.  This is 
sentiment is captured in the state’s motto… freedom and unity. 
 Vermont is also known for its many firsts.  It was the first state to join the original 
thirteen colonies and in doing so, became the first state to outlaw slavery.  It was the first state to 
print a postage stamp and the first to provide its citizens with a state university.  More recently, it 
became the first state to enact legislation that empowered the state’s legislature to vote on the 
continued operation of the VY.  Act 160, passed on May 8, 2006, states that a nuclear energy 
generating plant may only be operated in Vermont with the explicit approval of the General 
Assembly after full, open and informed public deliberation and discussion with respect to 
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pertinent factors, including the state’s need for power, the economics and environmental impacts 
of long-term storage of nuclear waste, and choice of power sources among various alternatives.23  
This legislation has become the cornerstone in the fight to close VY on schedule in 2012.  
Advocates 
The success of advocacy depends on the support and involvement of many people.  
Consolidating and using this kind of citizen power depends on the willingness and capacity of 
individuals and groups to collaborate to achieve common goals.  One organizational tool used 
to facilitate collaboration is the formation of coalitions and alliances. Their purpose is to bolster 
advocacy efforts by consolidating the strengths and resources of diverse groups to acquire a 
more powerful voice for invoking change.  The Safe Power Vermont coalition has become a 
powerful voice in the fight to ensure VY is retired in 2012.  Thus far, the coalition has 
succeeded in building and sustaining a large, diverse constituency that has had a direct impact 
on legislative action and policy.  This section provides an overview of the coalition’s, its 
membership, its organizational structure, function and governance.       
Safe Power Vermont – Vision & Mission  
In her book, Coalitions and Partnerships in Community Health, Francis D. Butterfoss 
identifies five essential characteristics of successful collaboration: 1) shared creation: joint 
action for mutual benefit, 2) interdependence and reciprocity, 3) mutual authority and 
accountability, 4) shared responsibility, risks, resources and rewards, and 5) inherent conflict 
and dynamic tension (2007, pp. 27)  
 The Safe Power Vermont coalition grew out of a need for coordination and 
collaboration among individuals and groups who opposed the continued operation of VY.  The 
union was catalyzed by the 2001 sale of VY to Entergy.  The New England Coalition (NEC), 
Citizens Awareness Network (CAN) and Nuclear Free Vermont (NFV) were the founding 
members of the coalition.  Over the years they have been joined by other state-wide and 
                                                 
23 Vermont General Assembly, 2006 
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regional organizations who shared similar goals such as the Vermont Public Interest Research 
Group (VPIRG), Vermont Citizens Action Network (VCAN), Toxics Action Center (TAC), 
Sierra Club, the Vermont Yankee Decommissioning Alliance (VYDA) and Greenpeace.  There 
are many other unaffiliated yet well informed and active citizens that participate in actions 
organized by one or all of the coalition members.   
 The coalition does not explicitly state its vision, but the prioritizing of goals and 
objectives is driven by the essence of a vision, which can be imaged as an equitable Vermont 
community that builds futures through the creation and implementation of policies that are 
considerate of the ecological, social and economic needs of both human and natural 
ecosystems.  This definition is dynamic and may not be wholly agreed upon by all coalition 
members over time and space.  The coalition’s mission is stated in many forms and formats, but 
is loosely interpreted as a desire to educate, organize and activate key constituencies in 
Vermont to move public policy and build awareness among community members.  Supporters 
do share three main goals, which are 1) to retire VY is retired on schedule in 2012, 2) to ensure 
that the decommissioning process beings promptly upon closure of the plant, and 3) to replace 
the power with a combination of energy conservation, increased efficiency and thoughtful 
application of renewable energy technologies within the state.  
   Vision and mission statements constitute the core of organizational stability and 
effectiveness.  The importance of such statements is discussed extensively in the literature.  In 
her book, F. Butterfoss defines a vision statement as an inspiring and uplifting image that is 
understood and shared by members of a community.  They are broad enough to be inclusive of 
diverse viewpoints and can be easily communicated to new members  (2007, p. 224).  In 
essence, a vision statement describes how a coalition, and its partners view themselves in the 
advocacy context and their role in those processes contained within.  A  mission statement 
compliments a vision statement by stating the fundamental reason for the organization’s 
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existence, i.e. the purpose of collaboration.24  It describes WHAT a coalition, or organization is 
going to do and WHY.     
Safe Power Vermont - Organizational Structure and Governance 
 The coalition’s organizational structure and governance allows for autonomy and 
equality among member organizations.  Each organization is governed independent of the 
coalition and often organize and/or participate in actions outside of the coalition’s strategic 
mission.  Chad Simmons, a long-time nuclear activist and coalition organizer, described the 
coalition’s organizational structure “… as adaptive, highly flexible and fluid (personal 
communication, May 16, 2009).”  This relationship has shown to be beneficial during times of 
conflict, when members may feel differently about the effectiveness, or practicality of a 
particular strategy or tactic.  For example, in 2009 elements of the coalition were passionate 
about amending a resolution to various town’s ballots on Town Meeting Day, which asked 
voters to disallow the continued operation of VY.  Some member organizations felt that there 
was a possibility that this tactic could work against the coalition’s strategy if the results were 
not in favor of closing VY.  Those organizations that opposed the ballot measure choose not to 
participate directly in the organizing effort.  The proponents implemented the ballot measure 
and where highly successful.  Out of the thirty-eight towns that voted on the issue, thirty-two 
voted to close VY.25 
 The coalition generally meets once a month more frequently if an event or action is 
planned, or if there is an abrupt change in the advocacy context such a policy or debate.  At 
least one representatives from each member organization tries to attend the meetings.  Meetings 
are run by one or more facilitators who organizes the agenda, prioritize topics for discussion 
and keep participants on track.  Minutes are recorded and distributed amongst members and 
within the broader network. The responsibility for facilitating meetings and recording the 
minutes is shared among member and changes periodically.  Lead organizers and activists also 
hold frequent meetings to update each other on current events, to solidify strategy and tactics, 
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as well as to garner additional support.  Constituents and other members of the public have 
access to aggregated information on current events and campaign developments via the network 
created among coalition members and their partners. 
 Coalition members are not bound by any formal agreements, rather they share an 
informal understanding of the value of their partnership and the role it plays in advocating for 
the public interest.  The absence of a formal description of each member organizations role and 
responsibilities can result in confusion, inequality and disillusionment.  C. Simmons (personal 
communication, May 16, 2009) noted that the lack of clarity in the roles, and to some extent 
responsibilities of members resulted in an internal conflict.  To some extent, this ambiguity is 
mitigated by active and open communication among members and their partners, as well as the 
ability of the leadership to resolve such conflicts justly and in a timely fashion.  It is apparent 
when review the coalition’s success that the organization is capable of analyze the 
sociopolitical environment, adopt an effective strategy and adapt the appropriate tactics to 
achieve desired outcomes.   
Safe Power Vermont – Coalition Members 
The NEC is the longest-standing member of the current network and fought against the 
construction of VY and other nuclear power plants being constructed during the 1960s and 
1970s.  The NEC was pivotal in convincing the governor of Maine to request an independent 
safety assessment of the Maine Yankee Nuclear Power Plant, which ensured an open and 
transparent review of the findings.  Assessors found that complacency and the failure to 
identify or promptly correct significant problems was apparent as demonstrated by previously 
undiscovered deficiencies in the reactor cooling system.  Assessors found other weaknesses 
such as inadequacies in ventilation systems, documentation that lacked rigor and completeness 
and inadequate emergency operation procedures.  Assessors noted that throughout the 
assessment process operators lacked a questioning attitude, which, in their judgment, “…was 
not conducive to discovering equipment problems, but rather to accepting equipment 
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performance.”26  The company acknowledged that economic pressures had limited their ability 
to complete projects and employ technologies that would improve plant safety and 
performance.  This ultimately lead to the plant’s owners discontinuing plant operations in 1997; 
fifteen years before its operating license expired.  
CAN was formed in the wake of a near catastrophic accident at the Yankee Rowe 
Nuclear Power Plant that occurred in 1992.  The citizens of western Massachusetts banded 
together to achieve a similar outcome as the NEC in Maine.  CAN’s advocacy efforts 
instrumental in the process by which the owners of the plant decided to discontinue operations.  
CAN has since expanded into five states, including Vermont.  The organization advocates for 
intervention by the governments of Massachusetts and New Hampshire whose citizens share 
the risks associated with being “downwind” of a nuclear reactor, but have no voice in 
determining the fate of VY; often referring the situation to “radiation without representation”. 
CAN created VCAN to act as its lobbying arm enabling the coalition to hire a paid 
lobbyist who advocates directly to Vermont legislators and gains critical information regarding 
their position on various issues such as VY.  This information is used by coalition members to 
rank legislators in order to target individual legislators for further advocacy efforts.  Today, 
CAN continues to capitalize on their strength as a grassroots organizer and its success using 
direct action.    
NFV was formed by a group of concerned citizens from Brattleboro, VT and other 
communities within Windham County.  Initially the group focused on getting a non-binding 
resolution on the 2002 Town Meeting Day ballot in as many towns across Vermont as possible 
in an attempt to raise awareness and demonstrate broad support.  The resolution called for 
citizens to vote in favor of retiring VY on schedule in 2012.  The resolution won 
overwhelmingly support from many of the local communities bolstering NFV’s effort to block 
the sale of VY to the Entergy Corporation ,  approval of a 20% “up-rate” in power generation 
and the approval of on-site radioactive waste storage in dry casks.  Though the outcomes were 
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less successful than had been hoped, the group was able to mobilize a large numbers of 
influential community leaders and their constituents who’s influence resulted in various safety 
and economic concessions including below market rates on the electricity sold to Vermont 
consumers generated by VY.    NFV continues to use Town Meeting Day as a platform for 
demonstrating public opposition and continue to win support from communities across 
Vermont. 
Safe Power Vermont & the Vermont Public Interest Research Group (VPIRG) 
Founded in 1972, VPIRG is one of Vermont's leading non-profit advocacy 
organizations.  The organization is supported by over 20,000 members, private donors and 
grant funding.  Their stated mission, “..is to promote and protect the health of Vermont's 
people, environment and locally-based economy by informing and mobilizing citizens 
statewide.”27.  In 1975, VPIRG established the Vermont Public Interest Research and Education 
Fund (VPIREF) to facilitate community outreach and education. The organization focuses its 
efforts on public policy issues that present opportunities to educate and activate key 
constituencies by building awareness of the vital links existing between Vermont’s ecosystems, 
communities and economy.  This is done in hopes of  invoking policy change that will lead the 
state, nation and the world down a more sustainable path.  Issue areas range from environment 
protection and conservation, health care, consumer protection and good governance.  The 
organization has be instrumental in the passage of many state legislative acts dealing with these 
issues. 
VPIRG and the VPIREF are managed by a fifteen member Board of Trustees 
administered by a President, Vice-President, Secretary and Treasurer.  The Board is composed 
of local professionals and business owners who are passionate about advocating for the public 
interest.  Collaboratively they prioritize issues and actions while managing the financial 
sustainability of the organization.  The organization employs nine staff members: an Executive 
Director, Associate Director, Office Manager, Development Manager, Clean Energy Program 
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Director, Health Care Advocate, Environmental Health Advocate, Field Director and a Field 
Associate.  VPIRG also has an extensive network of volunteers and organizes a statewide door-
to-door canvass each summer.   
The Executive Director is responsible for implementing the Board’s short- and long-
term goals, as well as supervising each advocates progress on initiatives relating to their 
particular issue.  The Executive Director is also engaged in promoting VPIRG’s and its 
positions national and is also active in other advocacy organizations.  The Associate Director is 
responsible for supervising the day-to-day operations of VPIRG; working together with the 
Office Manager and Development Manager to maintain a balanced budget and to ensure that at 
the end of each fiscal year there are sufficient funds to cover the coming years expenses.  This 
is accomplished through advertising, direct and indirect communication with members and 
donors, organized events and grant writing.  The team is also responsible for maintaining 
VPIRG’s extensive list of members and donors.      
The Advocates work closely with the Field Director and Associate to design and 
implement an effect strategy that will achieve positive outcomes using tactics which are 
relevant to the advocacy context.  While the Vermont Legislature is in session Advocates spend 
a majority of their time meeting with legislators, testifying before various legislative 
committees and holding public forums for constituents.  The Field Director and Associate 
coordinate actions with VPIRG’s network of allies to maximize the impact each has on 
achieving the goal of each campaign.  Staff members and volunteers characterize themselves as 
advocates and organizers who are working to protect the public interest by supporting policies 
that help to improve the quality of life in Vermont. 
 Recently, VPIRG has launched a Solar Communities initiative through a new entity 
called VPIRG Energy with the simple goal of make installing solar electric and hot water 
systems more affordable for Vermont homeowners.28  They have negotiated discounts with local 
vendors, worked to bundle incentives reducing the upfront cost to customers and arranged for 
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low interest financing.  The organization has begun working with residents in over ten 
communities throughout Vermont.  Over time, they hope to be able to offer this opportunity to 
more communities. 
In collaboration with Safe Power Vermont and it allies, VPIRG is able to react quickly 
to changes in policy debate.  The organization’s ability to act quickly and appropriately within 
the advocacy context can be attributed to good research and analysis, identifying the various 
actors and navigating the political landscape, clear strategy and tactical precision, as well as an 
effective method of monitoring and evaluation. 
Policy  
 Proponents of VY believe the plant is vital to the local and regional economy.  They 
argue that the plant’s closure would have a considerable negative impact on Vermont’s 
economy, which would be exacerbated locally due to the loss of employment, reduced 
economic activity and decreased tax revenue.  VY is one of the largest employers in Vermont 
and is among the top five in Windham County with just over 500 employees.  The loss of this 
workforce would likely cause a decline in local home values, suppression in new home 
construction and may lead to lay-off in other sectors of the economy increasing the burden on 
local and state governments.  Overall, the potential loss to the Vermont economy has been 
estimated to be from $1.5 billion to $5.1 billion over the twenty year relicensing period. 29  
These estimates do not take into account the labor required to decommission the plant and 
clean-up the contaminated site.  The entire reclamation process can take fifteen years or longer.  
Decommissioning project at other reactors have required the retention of as much as fifty 
percent of the workforce.30  
 Proponents also believe that nuclear energy is a “clean” source of energy due to its low 
carbon emissions and any replacement power supply would be carbon intensive, such as coal 
and oil, which would increase Vermont’s carbon footprint contributing to the anthropomorphic 
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phenomena known as climate change.  They rarely mention the tons of highly radioactive waste 
that is currently being stored at VY  and the reality of it remaining there into the foreseeable 
future.  Closure of VY would eliminate any further production of radioactive waste. 
 Opponents to the continued operation of VY believe Entergy has been negligent in 
operating an aging nuclear power plant twenty percent above its designed generation capacity.  
The practice has added additional stresses to the already weakened infrastructure, which has 
been made event by recent events at the plant, i.e. cooling tower collapse, tritium leaks, etc.  
The plant also does not meet current design safety standards and would not be built today.  The 
only reason to continue operating the plant is for short-term financial gain.  Moreover, there is 
no guarantee that the reactor will prove reliable and in these volatile times it is wiser to create a 
diversified and decentralized energy infrastructure that relies more heavily on in-state power 
generation. 
 Entergy continues to show itself as an entity that cannot be trusted to operate the plant 
in the interest of Vermonters.  The company has repeatedly blocked legal and legislative 
attempts to hold it accountable for decommissioning funding, as well as other state and federal 
such as water quality, fence-line radiation emissions and transparency of information.  Entergy 
executives have mislead legislators and have tried to dissolve themselves of any liability 
through attempted sale and corporate restructuring.  The concern is that Vermont ratepayers, 
and possible taxpayers will have to cover the shortfall in funding, which may include long-term 
payments for securing the nuclear waste stored in Vermont.  Advocates also believe that 
allowing the plant to continue operating past its design life unduly exposes current, and future 
generations to the environmental and economic risks associated with operating such a facility 
and storing the radioactive waste. 
  VY provides about 250 MW or roughly one-third of Vermont’s energy needs; the 
remainder is sold on the wholesale electric market.  The plant represents only two percent if the 
total generation capacity on the New England power grid.  Advocates believe the power can be 
replaced through a diverse package of energy solutions that includes conservation, efficiency 
and renewable energy.  Policy initiative that target energy efficiency and renewable energy can 
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generate significant environmental, social and economic benefit by generating long-term 
employment opportunities, lowering energy costs and reducing the internal, and external 
impacts of energy generation.  Efficiency is known for being the cheapest source of "power" 
costing,  on average, 2-3 cents per kWh.   Vermont utilities purchase power from VY  at a rate 
roughly fifty percent higher than efficiency and in 2012 this “cheap” rate expires with the PPA.  
A 2007 report to  the VDPS report showed that efficiency could reduce power consumption in 
Vermont by 215 MW by 2015 (GDS Associates, Inc., pp. 1).  This represents a significant 
portion of the power purchased from VY. 
 Vermont is not the first state to face this situation.  The citizens of Sacramento, 
California voted to close the Rancho Seco reactor in 1988 after an incident that caused a sixty 
percent loss in generation capacity; calling into question the plant’s reliability and economic 
viability.  The plant was closed in 1989 and the Sacramento Municipal Utility District (SMUD), 
owners of the reactor, replaced the power with a diverse package of energy solutions including 
small hydro, gas, solar, wind, efficiency and conservation.  Rancho Seco was a large 1,000 MW 
reactor. Vermont’s portion of Vermont Yankee is less than twenty-five percent of that.  Much 
of the skilled workforce at Rancho Seco was retained and employed in the decommissioning 
process.  In essence, VY does not offer a net benefit for Vermonters.  Overtime, the relationship 
with it owner, Entergy, will cost more than investing in sustainable energy alternatives and 
efficiency. 
 The NRC has exclusive authority over the safety aspects of licensing nuclear reactors, 
however, states retain jurisdiction over economic questions such as the need for additional 
generation, the type of facilities to be licensed, land use, ratemaking and reliability.  
Act 160 
 In 2006, Vermont became the first state to pass legislation empowering the state’s 
General Assembly to regulate the nuclear power industry in the interest of the public good.  Act 
160 passed with resounding support in both the Vermont House (unanimous vote) and the 
Senate (18-5), and was signed into law by the presiding Governor, Jim Douglas.  Even Entergy 
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supported the initiative quoted through a spokesperson as saying, "We commend the 
Legislature, especially the House Natural Resources (and Energy) Committee, for putting a lot 
of effort into drafting a bill that should serve the state well." Further stating that, "They 
[Entergy] recognized the importance of fully addressing the question of Vermont's future 
energy supplies."31   
 The law requires prior approval from the General Assembly to operate a nuclear power 
plant and store spent nuclear fuel in the state.  The law also limits the state’s authority to issues 
relating to reliability and economic “best interests”.  The state does not have jurisdiction over 
plant safety, which is reserved by the NRC.  The NRC has yet to deny a license extension and 
has been criticized for being too close to the industry.32  Under the authority of Act 160, the 
Vermont Senate voted twenty-six to four not to allow the VDPS to considered Entergy’s 
application for a Certificate of Public good.  Simultaneously, the federal government is pushing 
to expand the fleet of nuclear reactors in the US and extend the life of existing reactors.   With 
a commitment to renewables, conservation, and efficiency, Vermont could become a leader in 
job creation based on alternative energy. 
 Today, the coalition is stilled focused on ensuring that VY is retired on schedule 2012 
and decommissioning is initiated as soon as safely possible.  They also continue to hold 
Entergy liable for the cost of decommissioning VY and storing the spent fuel.   And, are 
committed to supporting the implementation of state energy policies that incentivize the use of 
renewable energy technologies for both commercial and residential customers, pushes for 
increases in energy efficiency and promotes the importance of energy conservation.  Much of 
the strategic and tactical planning is awaiting the federal court’s decision regarding Entergy’s 
case against Vermont, but advocates continue to engage their supporters in the issue and work 
to counteract Entergy’s influence among politicians and the public.   
Politics 
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The lines of authority between states and the federal government are, to a significant 
extent, defined by the 10th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and relevant Supreme Court 
cases.  Legally, states are not considered a creation of the federal government; rather the states 
compose the federal government; both operate within a system of parallel sovereignty.  The 
sovereignty of the federal government is strictly limited to the terms of the Constitution, whereas 
state sovereignty is limited only by 1) the sovereignty and powers that states have transferred to 
the federal government via the Constitution, and 2) the provisions of its own constitution, which 
usually (but not always) sets certain parameters for the exercise of the state's sovereignty.33  
 When it comes to regulating nuclear power plants, the U.S. Supreme Court agrees that 
both state and federal law applies to nuclear power.  In the case of Pacific Gas & Electric Co. vs. 
State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission (1983) the court held that a 
state statute regulating economic aspects of nuclear power plants such as the need for additional 
generating capacity, type of generating facilities to be licensed, land use and ratemaking was not 
preempted by the federal Atomic Energy Act of 1954.  The case provides a framework that has 
guided other cases involving preemption of federal authority.   
Overlap between state and federal authority is present in all sectors of the economy.  The 
energy sector is no different.  At the beginning of the 20th century electricity was generated and 
deliverer to consumer by a number of independent electrical utilities, but in the mid-1900s utility 
companies began to merge at a rapid pace and, overtime, the industry has come to be dominated 
by a few regional and national monopolies. Between 1933 and 1936, the Roosevelt 
administration’s “New Deal” policies brought federal regulation to the wholesale electric 
market.34  Today, regulatory authority sits with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC), which holds jurisdiction over interstate electricity sales, wholesale electric rates, 
hydroelectric licensing, natural gas pricing, and oil pipeline rates.   
 Over the years, states have enacted legislation to regulate the activities and actions of 
utilities operating locally through utility commissions, such as the Vermont Public Service Board 
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(VPSB).  Vermont has two entities that regulate the activities and actions of utilities operating 
within the state: the VPSB and the Department of Public Service (VDPS).  The VPSB is a quasi-
judicial board that supervises the rates, quality of service and overall financial management of 
Vermont's public utilities.  It also reviews the environmental and economic impacts of energy 
purchases and facilities, the safety of hydroelectric dams, the financial aspects of nuclear plant 
decommissioning and radioactive waste storage, and the rates paid to independent power 
producers.  The Board is tasked with providing an independent, fair and efficient means of 
resolving public utility disputes and guiding the development of state utility policies and rules to 
best serve the long-term interest of Vermont and its residents, as defined in Title 30 VSA §3 and 
§9. 
 The VDPS is an agency within the executive branch of Vermont state government.  
The Departments role is to represent the public interest in matters regarding energy, 
telecommunications, water and wastewater.  The department achieve this by: 1) 
representing the public interest in utility cases before the VPSB, federal regulatory agencies, 
and state and federal courts, 2) providing long range planning for the state's energy and 
telecommunications needs, 3) ensures benefits are shared among ratepayers, 4) promoting 
energy efficiency, 5) administering federal energy programs, 6) resolving utility customer 
complaints, 7) informing the public about utility-related matters, and 8) making and 
administering contracts for the purchase of power on behalf of the state.  As the public's 
advocate, VDPS is a separate agency from the VPSB. 
 Both houses of the Vermont legislature are responsible for overseeing energy 
development and economic sustainability.  Each have their respective committees discuss 
and draft policy.  The coalition has used these committee to their advantage and employs a 
two prong approach to advocacy.  On the one hand they advocate directly to legislature and 
its committees while raising awareness and building a constituency at the grassroots level.  
They direct their advocating power at: 
o State Legislators 
 Speaker of the House 
 Senate President/Pro Tem/Governor 
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 Natural Resource & Energy Committees 
 Economic Development Committees 
o The Public 
o Local Business  
The coalition allies itself with: 
o Legislators & state officials 
o Local Business 
o Local Media 
o Local Communities 
 Town Meeting Votes – 2009 & 2010 
o Voters 
o Other advocacy organizations  
Strategy 
 A well planned strategy acts as a road map that keeps advocates and activists on track 
through the chaos of a changing sociopolitical environment.  The strategy helps organizers: 1) 
remain focused on the objective(s), 2) undeterred by their opponents attempts to block change, 
3) keeps them steady in their message and 4) unifies their allies.  An effective strategy is 
designed around short-term objectives that are clear, specific and attainable, which relate 
directly to the  long-term goal(s) of the campaign. A strategy requires advocates to identify 
their target(s) and how they can be influenced. 
 The coalition’s strategy is guided by four core beliefs: 1) Act 160 remains the “best 
opportunity” to close VY, 2) legal action taken by the coalition members against government 
agencies such as the NRC and the VTDPS and Entergy continue to be fruitful in delaying the 
process to the advantage of the advocates 3) public outreach and direct action have effectively 
raised public awareness, influenced public opinion, pressured policy makers and Entergy 
officials, and helped in mobilizing a powerful constituency; and 4) the use of media has been an 
effective tool  at raising awareness and influencing key stakeholders in both the social and 
political arenas.    
 The passage of Act 160 was a turning point in the movement and solidified the 
coalition’s purpose.  To achieve this success advocates took the time to carefully craft its 
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message.  Rather than make the bill a pro- or anti-nuclear power vote, in their literature and 
meetings with legislators, advocates spoke about “good governance” and the responsibility of 
the legislature for “due diligence” on a critical issue facing the future of the state.  They argued 
that such decisions should be made “in Vermont by Vermonters”; not by the NRC or an out-of-
state corporate owner like Entergy.  This struck at the heart of Vermont values and helped to 
garner support from legislators and their constituents.  
 Coalition leaders and advocates worked closely with supportive legislators to amend the 
bill; mandating studies of the economic, health and environmental impact of extending VY’s 
operations.  The law required the state to hold  public hearings periodically throughout the 
review process.  In the end, with no hope of defeating the bill, the oppositional leadership 
supported the initiative as a good governance bill.   
Districts are targeted and prioritized based on information obtained directly from 
legislators and/or their constituents.  This information is used to rank officials in terms of their 
relative position on a particular issue.  For example, if Representative X supports one of the 
coalition’s initiatives they would receive a lower ranking and their district would be less of a 
priority.  Organizing efforts have been focused mainly in those districts whose legislators are 
unsure of their position or not yet committed to one.  The primary goal of organizing in targeted 
districts is to build a constituency through awareness raising and inspire them to act in their 
own interest.  This strategy has been effective at mobilize constituents and directly impacts the 
political positions legislators take.    
 Following the impact studies and public engagement processes, advocates began push 
for a legislative vote on the issue.  The collation’s leadership, together with their allies in the 
legislature discussed the best method of introducing the issue into the General Assembly and in 
which house would they be most successful.  Ultimately, it was decided to introduced the 
resolution into the Senate  Committee on Natural Resources and Energy as a resolution to keep 
the VPSB from reviewing Entergy’s application for a CPG.  The resolution won overwhelming 
support from the majority of Vermont’s Senators and their constituents.  The decision to force 
the vote in the Senate as opposed to the House of Representative was based on simple numbers.  
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Vermont has thirty Senate seats and 150 Representatives; coalition leaders realized that they 
would have a greater impact by concentrating their resources on fewer targets.  Advocates had 
also gained the support of key Senators, including the Senate President, who held sway over the 
more progressive elements within the caucus.      
Since the 2010 Senate vote, coalition members have continued to share in the 
responsibility of organizing constituency in key legislative districts throughout Vermont.  
While the coalition applies pressure from the bottom through its grassroots organizers and 
activist, it also employs a lobbyist to communicate directly with key legislators  This has been a 
very effective method of gathering information that has been helpful in determining tactics and 
timing.  The coalition has organized numerous protests and rallies throughout the state.  The 
coalition has also been proactive in arranging public forums where constituents can discuss the 
issues with their representatives in a “town hall” style meeting and has coordinated numerous 
events that showcase experts in related fields who speak on the issues and their impacts. 
Tactics 
 In the world of community organizing and policy advocacy, tactics means doing what 
you can with what you have.  The premise of tactics is to develop a mechanism that will 
maintain a constant pressure on the opposition or target.  A good tactic is directed, clearly 
identifies or singles out the target to constituents, personalizes the target by humanizing public 
and private institutions and lastly, polarizes the target using socio-cultural norms to stigmatize 
behavior.  A successful tactic is also one that supporters are willing, and able to do, can be 
deployed quickly and sustained over a long period of time.  Not only is pressure essential to 
compel the establishment to make its initial concessions, but the pressure must be maintained to 
make the establishment deliver.35 
 Having a clear and poignant message is an essential element in successful deploying 
campaign tactics.  The message must strict at the core values and beliefs that each person holds.  
The message must be framed in such a way as to impassion a sense of urgency and a need for 
                                                 
35 Alinsky, 1971, pp. 142 
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action.  The framing process entails narrowing research down to the most salient, important 
points.  A frame can be defined as a organizing principle that is socially shared and persistent 
over time that work symbolically to bring meaningfully structure to the world around us.36 
Frames can be defined using three levels of frames. Level one frames focus on big ideas such as 
freedom, justice, community, success, prevention, responsibility and sovereignty.  Level two 
frames present issue-types like the environment, health, safety, climate change, reliability and 
the economy.  Level three frames speak to the specific issue(s); for example, nuclear waste 
storage, job development, state revenue generation and renewable energy. 
 The message is as important as the messenger.  Picking the right person and/or forum  
affects how the message is heard.  Individuals earn credibility based on how well they 
communicate.  Thorough research, command of the facts and accuracy is what distinguishes an 
effect .  “The best strategy for change is to have public opinion on your side.  That, more than 
clever tactics, is what wins advocacy efforts and protects them (Schultz, 2002, pp. 82).”    
Messages 
 Major safety concerns related to the aging nuclear facility 
 No viable system for disposal of nuclear waste (stored on-site) 
 Local environmental contamination due to leakage of affluent from the facility 
 Inadequate emergency evacuation plan in the event of a radiological release 
Communicating the message in a bold and compelling way, will help make the issues 
more meaningful and applicable to Vermont citizens. That is why framing a message is crucial.  
 Vermonters are divided on the issue of nuclear power and VY.  Voters see VY as 
creating good paying jobs and an important source of revenue for the local economy.  The 
coalition has realized that they cannot win this argument, even by talking about the jobs that 
will be created moving to clean energy economy.  Instead, the coalition pivots back to its core 
message - closing the plant as scheduled is the safe and responsible thing to do.  Entergy’s 
position is that it is, “committed to keeping Vermont’s environment strong and healthy” and 
producing “pollution-free energy” that contributes to the state’s low carbon footprint.  
                                                 
36 Frameworks Institute, 2011, pp. 5 
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Advocates responded by highlighting the not so clean aspects of VY such as the radioactive 
waste and underground tritium leaks. 
Messengers    
 Advocacy groups  
o New England Coalition (est. 1960s) 
o Citizens Awareness Network (est. 1992) 
o Nuclear Free Vermont by 2012 
o Vermont Public Interest Research Group 
o Toxics Action Center 
o Conservation Law Foundation 
o Vermonters for a Clean Environment 
 Vermont legislators and other local officials 
 Citizens 
Taking Action 
 Efforts made to try and stop the construction of VY 
 Creating ballot initiatives on Town Meeting Days 
 Blocking the sale of VY  
 Bring attention to the issue regionally and nationally 
 Organizing displays of civil disobedience, i.e. protests 
 Lobbying the Vermont legislator and local representatives 
Evaluation & Learning 
  Reflecting upon my research and experience has enabled me to identify some of the 
strengths and weakness of the coalition, as well as to offer a perspective on future opportunities 
and potential threats.  Using a SWOT analysis, I am able to present my findings in a more clear 
and concise framework.  The framework is helpful in illustrating where the coalition has been, 
where it is at and where it may go in the future.      
Strengths 
 Strong internal and external networks 
 Large constituency 
 Committed volunteer base 
 Adaptability & Flexibility 
 Knowledge base of leadership & staff 
 Experience of leadership & staff 
 Out-of-state support 
Weaknesses 
 Monitoring & Evaluation  
 Lacking continuity of leadership 
 Limits of technology as a 
communication tool  
 Lack of organizational diversity 
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Opportunities 
 Creating alliances with labor 
organization, institutes of education and 
small business groups 
 Deepening out-of-state support 
  Monitoring & Evaluation 
 Increase organizational diversity 
Threats 
 Membership fatigue 
 Funding 
 Internal conflict 
 Future verdict 
 Lack of organizational diversity  
 The analysis identified opportunities for organizational growth and development, as 
well as identified potential threats to stability of the organization and its sustainability.  The 
research identified five key recommendations that may need consideration as the coalition 
moves forward in its efforts to win this precedent setting vote.  Below are listed the key 
recommendations:  
1. Revisit the vision and mission 
2. Solidify organizational framework (roles & responsibilities) 
3. Seek partnerships with key stakeholder groups 
4. Formal resource sharing agreements (MOU’s) 
5. Look at “time banking” as an incentive for volunteer participation 
 This moment provides a good opportunity for coalition members to re-evaluate the 
function and functionality of the organization.   roles and responsibilities, also must be clarified 
to avoid internal conflict and increase efficiency within the coalition.  The coalition must begin 
to seek partnership with key stakeholder groups such as labor organizations, educational 
institutions and small business groups.  These three stakeholder groups are essential in VT’s 
energy transition.  Establishing memorandums of understanding (MOU”S) between member 
organizations can stream line resource sharing and ensure that all parties are contributing to the 
campaign equally.  Lastly, to increase the volunteer base there may be a need to provide 
incentives.  “Time banking” is a method that allows an individual to “bank” their time spent 
working for the campaign and use it at a later date to elicit help from another individual in the 
in the time banking system.  This could be an effective way of garnering the support needed to 
sustain the campaign.  
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 Vermont is at a crossroads. Vermont can lead the way toward future innovation or not.  
Vermonters have an opportunity to lead the way and set the tone for clean, safe energy for 
generations to come.  
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